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These papers describe the current economic conditions and outline some of the
opportunities facing Minnesota farmers as they complete 1998 and develop plans for 1999. The
first paper, Prospects For Farm Income in 1998, describes the variation in net farm income
farmers in the Southeastern and Southwestern Farm Management Associations have experienced
over the past twenty years. The possible effects of 1998's low commodity prices and government
program payments on net farm income are discussed in the context of this historical variation.
This paper points out that some farmers are experiencing a very good year in 1998, while others
may have very low net farm income this year. Those with high incomes in 1998 may be primarily
interested in opportunities to enhance their cash flow for 1999, while those experiencing financial
stress during 1998 may need to consider a wider range of adjustments as they plan for the coming
year.  
The remaining papers provide information farmers may want to consider as they plan their
marketing and financial strategies for the coming year. Financial Management Alternatives
outlines a wide range of financial management alternatives that can be used to deal with cash flow
problems. Some of these alternatives will be of interest to farmers who have difficulty in
projecting a positive net cash flow with the relatively low commodity prices being projected for
1999. Others are of primary interest to farmers who have relatively high debt levels and must find
ways to improve both their net cash flow and their debt/asset position.
 
Some observers have suggested that the low commodity prices projected for 1999 may
lead to reductions in cash rental rates. The paper, Cropland Rental Market Impacts of Low Crop
Prices, discusses a procedure to estimate “fair rental rates”, and provides an historical perspective
of the impact low commodity prices have had on land rental rates. The remaining two papers,
Situation and Outlook For the Livestock Sector, and Considerations in Developing a
Corn/Soybean Marketing Plan for 1998/1999, discuss the major factors to evaluate and options
to consider in developing a marketing plan for corn, soybeans, hogs and cattle for the coming
year. 
These papers are also available through the Department’s home page. The address is
http://www.apecon.agri.umn.edu/  Questions about the content of the papers and the
recommendations they contain should be addressed to the authors of the respective papers.
November 1998     Vernon R. Eidman
iAssociate Professor, Department of Applied Economics, College of Agricultural, Food, and
1
Environmental Sciences, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN.
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THE PROSPECTS FOR FARM INCOME IN 1998
by Kent Olson
1
This fall’s low prices are putting tremendous downward pressure on farm income in 1998
and into 1999.  The impact, however, will be mixed.  For some farms, income is expected to fall
to extremely low levels.  Other farms, especially dairy farms, will not experience these low
incomes and may, in fact, do quite well.  To help us understand how this has happened and to put
this in a historical perspective, this paper begins with a historical perspective on farm income and
then looks at recent trends in prices, costs, production and export levels, and recent changes in
U.S. farm policy.  The paper concludes with estimates of 1998 farm income for two groups of
farms in Minnesota.
Farm Income trends
Farming has always been a risky business.  However, not all farms experience the same
level of risk.  That is, riskiness is not just due to yields and prices but also by the type of farm and
the management choices of the farm operators.  This riskiness and the effect of the type of farms
can be seen by looking at the income trends of two groups of farms: the Southwestern Minnesota
Farm Business Management Association and the Southeastern Minnesota Farm Business
Management Association.  The Southeast Association contains a larger proportion of dairy farms
than the Southwest Association and consequently do not suffer the variability in income that the
grain, hog, and beef farms have been experiencing.
From 1978 through 1997, the average farm in the Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business
Management Association has experienced a wide range of accrual net farm income (Figure 1a). 
Measured in nominal dollars, net farm income has ranged from a low of $2,272 in 1981 to a high
of $63,404 in 1987, a range of $61,132.  During these 20 years, average accrual net farm income
has been above $50,000 seven times and below $25,000 three times. While some farms in the
Association have had negative incomes, the average has never been negative.  The 20-year
average is $38,316 before accounting for inflation and $55,598 after accounting for inflation and
thus expressing the 20 year average in terms of estimated buying power in 1998.  Similar patterns
of riskiness can be seen in the rates of return to assets and equity and in the level of equity and the
ending debt-asset ratio for the average farm in the Southwestern Minnesota Association (Figures
2a and 3a).  The steady rise in average asset values and equity is a good trend.  However, note
that the jump between 1992 and 1993 is due in very large part to a change from using cost basis
to market basis for valuing assets.
During the same 20 years, the average farm in the Southeastern Minnesota Farm Business
Management Association also experienced a wide range of accrual net farm income (Figure 1b)
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3
Association ranged from a low of $16,709 in 1985 to a high of $73,311 in 1997, a range of
$56,602.  During these 20 years, average accrual net farm income has been above $50,000 six
times and below $25,000 only twice. While some farms in the Association have had negative
incomes, the Southeast Association has also never had a negative average.  The 20-year average
is $42,778 before accounting for inflation and $59,397 after accounting for inflation.  As
previously noted, similar patterns of riskiness can be seen in the rates of return to assets and
equity and in the level of equity and the ending debt-asset ratio for the average farm in the
Southeastern Minnesota Association (Figures 2b and 3b).
Product and Input Prices
  All major commodities (except milk) are experiencing low prices this fall.  Product prices
have dropped considerably from where they were in early 1998 and especially 1997 and 1996. 
However, they have not dropped significantly below the levels seen in late 1994 and early 1995. 
Since January, 1994, according to Minnesota Agricultural Statistics Service, the highest price was
$3.95 in August, 1996, and the lowest price was $1.83 in September, 1994 (Figure 4).  In
September, 1998, the average corn price for Minnesota was $1.80 per bushel. Wheat and soybean
prices tell a similar story.  Hog and beef prices in Minnesota are lower in 1998 but not as low as
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Even though the prices received by farmers have continued to increase with some
fluctuations, the prices paid by farmers for inputs have continued their general increase over time
(Figure 6).  The resulting squeeze felt by farmers between prices and costs can be seen in the
downward movement in the ratio of prices received to prices paid.
The current concern over farm income is often compared to the situation in the 1980s
when there was a prolonged period of low farm income.  During that period, the high interest
rates were often pointed to as a source of high costs and thus low income.  Now that situation is
not true.  Interest rates are not at the levels they were in the early 1980s and, thus, not as large a
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5
Land prices, as reported by Taff in his 1997 survey, have continued their rise in recent
years.  For the whole state, the mean sales price rose from $912 per acre in 1996 to $939 in 1997.
In the southern part of the state, average sales were over $1,100 per acre in 1997 with the South
Central district reporting sales just under $1,700 per acre.  Lazarus (1998) reports an almost
continual rise in land rent since 1988 to almost $80 per acre in a statewide USDA survey and
almost $90 per acre paid by members in the Southwestern Minnesota Farm Management
Association (Figure 8).  The only sustained decline in rental rates occurred with the financial crisis
in the 1980s.  The wet year of 1993 provided some downward pressure on rental rates in 1994,
but the upward trend continued in 1995 and after.
Domestic Production and Exports
The world situation of supply and demand has contributed to the downward pressure on
prices and thus farm income.  For several years, the world has not experienced a major production
disaster.  That, coupled with expected and actual reports of record and near record production in
the U.S., has created a very good supply of both food and feed grains and livestock products. 
The USDA estimates the ending stocks at the end of the 1997/98 marketing year to be 58%
higher for corn and 53% higher for soybeans than a year earlier.  Stock at the end of the 1998/99
marketing year are estimated to rise even more.6
On the demand side, exports of U.S. agricultural goods have suffered due mainly to
trouble in several Asian economies.  The latest USDA forecast of exports in fiscal 1998 is for a
total value of $54.5 billion, down from $57.3 billion in fiscal 1997 and $59.8 billion in fiscal 1996
(Whitton, 1998).  The fiscal 1998 estimate is very close to the fiscal 1995 actual results.  Exports
of grain and feeds, which are critical to Minnesota farmers for price support, are estimated to be
down $2.5 billion in fiscal 1998 from fiscal 1997.  For the fiscal year 1999, USDA estimates that
the physical quantity will increase but the total value will decrease.  The value of exports of grains
and feeds is estimated to be stable, but the exports of oilseeds and products is estimated to decline
by $1.8 billion in fiscal 1999.
Policy changes
The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 (i.e., the new farm
bill) made significant changes in the market orientation and exposure of U.S. farmers.  Under the
previous policy, market prices were not supported directly, but farmers received an income
support payment directly linked to historical production if the market price was lower than that
commodity's target price.  Except for the loan program, FAIR removed the final link between the
market price and the support payments farmers receive for wheat, corn, grain sorghum, barley,
oats, rice, and upland cotton.  Instead of price-sensitive support payments, FAIR provides for 7
annual fixed but declining payments to 2002 when, presumably, support payments will end.  FAIR
also eliminates most acreage use restrictions, suspends the Farmer-Owned Reserve program,
eliminates the dairy price support starting in the year 2000, reduces the funds for commercial
agricultural export programs, extends the conservation and wetland reserve programs, authorizes
several new conservation and rural development programs, and extends the Food Stamp Program
and many research and extension programs.
These policy changes have been blamed for the projected drop in farm income due to the
removal of target price supports for farmers.  However, as has been seen this fall, price protection
has not been removed entirely.  Farmers can still place their crops in storage and receive a
commodity loan from the government.  Alternatively, they can receive a loan deficiency payment
(LDP) if the posted county price (PCP) drops below the county loan rate.  These rules and the
rationale for choosing to take advantage of these programs are presented in detail in another
paper in this series.  While the loan rate does provide a safety net by being above the variable
costs of production for most farmers, the loan rate is below the total costs of production for most
crops.
1998 Income Estimates
To estimate the impact of this fall’s low prices on farm income in 1998, the average
income statements for the Southwestern and Southeastern Minnesota Farm Business Management
Associations are adjusted by the estimated changes in prices, yields, and government payments. 
All other variables, such as crop acreages, numbers of livestock, production methods, etc., were
assumed to remain at 1997 levels.  This simple method does not reflect the complexity of farmers’7
decision making and the differences in the economic conditions between 1997 and 1998. 
However, this estimate does provide an indicator of the severity of the potential income change
and the need for corrective actions to be taken now.
For the price estimate, monthly prices for 1997 and the first 9 months for 1998 are taken
from Minnesota Agricultural Statistics Service (MNASS).  Prices for the remaining 3 months of
1998 are estimated based on current market trends.  Simple annual averages are then used to
calculate prices changes.  Since we do not know when during the year Association members sell
their crop, the estimated change in the average prices from 1997 to 1998 is used to estimate the
change in the value of sales.  For example, the corn price in 1998 is estimated to be 84% of the
1997 level.  So if everything else is constant, 1998 corn sales are estimated to be 85% of the 1997
level due to price changes alone; soybean sales, 80%; beef, 95%; and hogs, 69%.  Due to the
widespread use of hog contracts which guarantee a certain price, the decrease in the hog price is
not as large as the market now indicates for purely cash sales.  Milk, the only positive spot in
these prices, is expected to have an average 1998 price that is at least 13% above 1997 levels.
The 1997 crop sales are also adjusted for yield changes to estimate the cash crop sales for
1998.  If they do not feed their grain to their own livestock, farmers usually sell in the current year
the crop they produced last year.  (This isn’t true for all farms, but is the usual case and is why
this assumption is made.)  Thus, 1997 crop sales are most likely from crops produced in 1996. 
To make a yield-adjusted estimate of crop 1998 sales, 1997 sales (of crops produced in 1996) are
adjusted by the change in yields between 1996 and 1997.  In 1996, the average corn yield in the
Southwestern Association was 133 bushels and 126 bushels in 1997.  Thus, for lack of a better
estimate of changes in physical sales, 1998 corn sales for the Southwestern Association are
estimated to be 95% of the 1997 level due to changes in yields alone.
To estimate the net effect of price and yield changes on 1998 crop sales, the 1997 average
sales are multiplied by the 1998 price as a percent of the 1997 price (e.g., 84% for corn) and by
the difference in yields between 1996 and 1997 (e.g., 95% for corn in the Southwest Association). 
The average corn sales in the Southwest Association are estimated, for example, to decline from
$72,569 in 1997 to $57,918 in 1998.
Similar physical adjustments for livestock sales are not as obvious or as easy, so they are
not made in these estimates of 1998 income.  Price adjustments are made however, for livestock
sales; 1998 livestock sales are estimated by multiplying the 1997 level by the 1998 price as a
percent of the 1997 price.
While transition payments under the 1996 FAIR act are estimated not to change between
1997 and 1998, two recent policy changes will increase the government payment to farmers.
Under the FAIR Act, the transition payment per bushel of corn will drop from $0.46 in 1997 to
$0.36, but farmers were required to pay back about $0.10 per bushel in 1997 from a 1996
payment so that change is nullified.  However, recently the federal government changed the rules
to allow farmers to elect to receive all of their 1999 FAIR transition payments in 1998.  Some
farmers may elect to receive all of their 1999 payments; others may not.  For this estimate of 1998
income, half of the farmers are estimated to choose to receive it if the average income for the8
Association is estimated to be negative.  The other change is Congress’ attempt to help farmers
suffering from low prices by increasing the transition payment for 1998.  At the time of this
estimate, this emergency payment to all farmers was estimated to be 52% of the scheduled 1998
transition payment.
All other cash income is estimated to decrease by 11% based on USDA’s index of all
prices received by farmers: 139 in 1997 and estimated to be 124 in 1998.
Based on USDA’s index of prices paid by farmers in May 1998 versus May 1997, farm
expenses are estimated to decline by 2%.  Since sales are already estimated to be lower, 1998 cash
expenses for the Southwestern Association are also estimated to drop another $5,000 to account
for fewer expenses for 1999 being prepaid in 1998.  This figure of $5,000 is an arbitrary number
chosen to account for this expected behavior of farmers.  For the Southwestern Association, it is
approximately 21% of the ending 1997 value of prepaid expenses and supplies.  Since the
Southeastern Association does not have, as will soon be seen, a large drop in income, no change
in prepaid expenses is estimated although expenses are decreased by 2% as indicated by the
USDA index.  Similarly, farmers in the Southwestern Association are expected to decrease their
capital expenditures for machinery and equipment so depreciation is estimated to  drop to $30,000
in 1998.  However, farmers in the Southeastern Association are expected to maintain their 1998
capital expenditures at 1997 levels due to a smaller drop in income.
Accrual net farm income, a more accurate estimate of the current year’s income, accounts
for changes in inventory levels.  In both Associations, inventory levels of crops are adjusted from
ending 1997 levels by the price change from December 1997, to the estimated price for December
1998, and by the increase in inventories due to higher yields in 1998.
The balance sheet was adjusted to account for changes in the retained earnings.  The
specific changes to individual categories are made arbitrarily to reflect a farmer’s choices of
spreading an operating loss over higher debt, lower cash balances, and liquidation of nonfarm
assets.  A positive income is also spread over the same categories, but changes are obviously in
the opposite direction.  Because of the uncertainty of any effects on asset values, no adjustments
were made to any asset category (e.g., machinery, land, buildings).  The only exceptions are the
change in inventory values of crops and livestock and a small decline in the total machinery value
(10% in the Southwest and 5% in the Southeast) due to a decrease in capital expenditures.  Thus,
the effect on the debt-asset ratio and the rates of return should be viewed as indicative of the
potential impact of the change in income.
Estimates for the Southwestern Association.  Based on the procedures just described,
the accrual net farm income for the average member of the association is estimated to be a minus
$16,229 in 1998 (Table 1).  This is a drop of 140 percent from the 1997 average of $40,598.  This
estimate is not as drastic as an earlier estimate made in August (Olson), but it still would be the
first negative average accrual net farm income in the 59-year history of the Southwestern
Association.
Net cash farm income is also estimated to decline in the Southwestern Association.  The9
specific estimate is harder to make because of our inability to estimate whether farmers will sell or
store their grain at the end of 1998.  The accrual net farm income provides a more accurate
picture of income production within the year and is easier to estimate because the value of
inventories are included in the calculation.  So whether the grain, for example, is sold or stored, it
is counted as income in the calculation of accrual net farm income.
When these losses are factored into the balance sheet, the debt/asset ratio is estimated to
rise from 48% at the end of 1997 to 52% at the end of 1998 with assets valued on a market basis
(Table 2).  The rate of return on assets (ROA) drops from 6.3%  to  -1.9% and the rate of return
on equity (ROE)  drops from 5.1%  to -8.3%.  Both ROA and ROE are estimated using assets
valued on a market basis.  These changes are estimated with no adjustments (other than estimated
normal depreciation) in the value of capital assets such as machinery, breeding livestock,
buildings, and land.  If those values are lowered, the debt-to-asset ratio would rise and the
financial condition worsen.
Estimates for the Southeastern Association.  Following the same procedures, the
accrual net farm income for the average member of the Southeastern Association is estimated to
be $54,863 in 1998 (Table 3).  This is a decrease of 25 percent from the 1997 record average of
$73,312.  This income estimate is higher for the Southeastern Association than for the
Southwestern Association because the Southeastern Association has a much larger proportion of
dairy farms which are benefitting from high milk prices, low feed prices, and increased
government assistance in 1998.
When the 1998 income is factored into the balance sheet, the debt/asset ratio is estimated
to fall from 37% at the end of 1997 to 32% at the end of 1998 with assets valued on a cost basis
(Table 4).  The rate of return on assets (ROA) drops from 8.7%  to 7.3% and the rate of return
on equity (ROE)  drops from 9.2%  to 6.8%.  Both ROA and ROE are estimated using assets
valued on a cost basis.  Again, these changes are estimated with no adjustments (other than
estimated normal depreciation) in the value of capital assets such as machinery, breeding
livestock, buildings, and land.
Around the state, the situation will be different.  In the Northwest part of Minnesota, farm
incomes have been low for several years due to scab and weather problems.  The current low
prices for wheat will only exacerbate the problems they have been facing.10
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Table 1. Estimated 1998 Net Farm Income for the average farm
             in the Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business Management Association.
actual estimated estimated predicted percent
1997 prices yields 1998  change
(208 farms) (98 as % of 97) (97 as % of 96)
Gross Cash Farm Income
Corn 72569 84% 95% 57918 
Soybeans 86906 80% 100% 69535 
Beef 37010 95% 34985 
Milk 13902 113% 15748 
Hogs 91965 69% 63299 
Transition pmts. 8486  12611  (Includes ½ of 99 payment)
LDPs 0 10000 
Emergency $ 0  4413  (52% of 98 payment)
All other  48872  89% 43598 
Total Gross 359710  312107  -13%
Decr. in "prepaids":
Cash Farm Expense 303241  98% -5000  293101  -3%
NET CASH FARM INCOME
56469 19006  -66%
Inventory Changes
   Crops & Feed  -2086  8419 
    Market Livestock  11614  -8654 
    Accts Rec & other  2022  0 
    Prepaid Exp & Supp.  7055  -5000 
    Accts Payable  1164  0 
  Total Inventory  19769  -5235  -126%
Depreciation & other capital adjustments
-35640 -30000  -16%
NET FARM INCOME 40598  -16229  -140%
    less est. family living 34139  30000 
    less income tax paid 9542  8000 
    plus nonfarm income 18982  20000 
RETAINED EARNINGS 15899  -34229 
YIELDS: corn soybean
1996 133 42 
1997 126 42 
est.1998 170 53 12
Table 2. Ending Balance Sheet for the Southwestern Minnesota Association
1998 
actual predicted estimates
1997 1998  using
cost basis:
ASSETS (market values)
Current  Assets 219495 195546 195546 
Intermediate Assets 215895  196044  63881 
Long-Term  Assets 447823 447823 296204 
TOTAL FARM ASSETS 883213 839413 555631 
Total Nonfarm Assets 133096  131096  102176 
TOTAL ASSETS 1016309 970509 657807 
LIABILITIES
Current farm liabilities 144096 164096 164096 
Intermediate farm liabilities 46090 46090 46090 
Long-term farm liabilities 128562 128562 128562 
TOTAL FARM LIABILITIES 318748 338748 338748 
Total Nonfarm Liabilities 9095 11095 11095 
Total Deferred Liabilities 162297 154182  0 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 490140 504025 349843 
NET WORTH (farm & nonfarm) 526169  466484  307964 
Net Worth CHANGE 46216  -59685  -54063 
RATIO ANALYSIS
Total Liabilities / Assets 48% 52% 53%
ROA 6.3% -1.9% -2.8%
ROE 5.1% -8.3% -12.3%
value of operator's labor & mgt = 25000  25000 
interest payment used for ROA= actual 1997 payment 22282  22282 13
Table 3. Estimated 1998 Net Farm Income for the average farm
             in the Southeastern Minnesota Farm Business Management Association.
actual estimated estimated predicted percent
1997 prices yields 1998  change
(64 farms) (98 as % of 97) (97 as % of 96)
Cash Farm Income
Corn 57517 84% 116% 56147 
Soybeans 50126 80% 105% 42016 
Beef 10675 95% 10091 
Milk 100984 113% 114395 
Hogs 22087 69% 15202 
Transition pmts. 12244  12244 
LDPs 0 10000 
Emergency $ 0  6367  (52% of 98 payment)
All other  41054  89% 36624 
Total Gross  294687  303086  3%
Cash Farm Expense 225501  98% 221679  -2%
NET CASH FARM INCOME
69186 81407  18%
Inventory Changes
    Crops & Feed  16458  -4413 
    Market Livestock  1429  -6131 
    Accts Rec & other  184  0 
    Prepaid Exp & Supp.  2223  0 
    Accts Payable  717  0 
Total Inventory Change 21011  -10544  -150%
Depreciation & other capital adjustments
-16885 -16000  -5%
NET FARM INCOME 73312  54863  -25%
    less est. family living 32840  30000 
    less income tax paid 12009  12000 
    plus nonfarm income 26290  26000 
RETAINED EARNINGS 54753  38863 
YIELDS: corn soybean
1996 126 42 
1997 146 44 
est.1998 170 53 14




Current Assets 150520  145383 
Intermediate Assets 145319  139916 
Long-Term Assets 255445  255445 
TOTAL FARM ASSETS 551284 540744 
Total Nonfarm Assets 122095  129095 
TOTAL ASSETS 673379 669839 
LIABILITIES
Current farm liabilities 40310 30310 
Intermediate farm liabilities 68393 58393 
Long-term farm liabilities 130836 115836 
TOTAL FARM LIABILITIES 239539 204539 
Total Nonfarm Liabilities 11461 9461 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 251000 214000 
NET WORTH (farm & nonfarm) 422379  55839 
Net Worth CHANGE 34933  33460 
RATIO ANALYSIS
Total Liabilities / Assets 37% 32%
ROA 8.7% 7.3%
ROE 9.2% 6.8%
value of operator's labor & mgt = 25000 
estimated 1998 interest for ROA= 1997 actual amount 18957 Olson is an Associate Professor and Nordquist and Weness are Extension Educators in
1
the Department of Applied Economics, College of Agricultural, Food, and Environmental
Sciences, University of Minnesota.
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Financial Management Alternatives
Kent Olson, Dale Nordquist, and Erlin Weness
1
While we do not know what the exact income figures will be, we do know that the major
impact of the current low prices will be low income.  The first step for farmers--and everyone
involved in agriculture--is to fight the urge to deny this problem.  The second step is to respond in
ways they deem appropriate to their situation.
Farmers, their families, and their business colleagues need to be aggressive in their search
and implementation of alternatives; they can’t afford to be passive.  One of the first items that
should be on the list of things to do is “talk.”  Farmers need to talk with their spouse and family,
their friends, their bankers, and everyone else involved with their business.  Communication is
very important — communication about the situation and about alternatives.  Listen to more
people than yourself and the people in the coffeeshop.  Discuss the situation and alternatives with
your management team: your spouse, family, partners, lenders, and other people critical to the
success of your business.
To assess where a farm is or where it is headed, a cash flow should be done for both the
remainder of 1998 and all of 1999.  Doing them together is necessary because some alternatives
may be beneficial for one year and detrimental in the other year.  For example, asking for the full
1999 transition payments in 1998 may help the cash flow and income situation in 1998 but it will
decrease the cash receipts in 1999.  Doing the cash flows for both years will allow better informed
decisions to be made.  Also, the tax implications of alternatives may affect both years.
The following financial management alternatives are listed roughly from the easiest change
or adjustment to the most severe.  How far down the list a farmer needs to go depends on how
bad the initial cash flow problem is estimated to be.  The basic idea of each alternative is described
as well as some potential concerns that need to be evaluated before the alternative is chosen.
Improving marketing skills. One of the first financial skills needed for the remainder of 1998 and
in the future is better marketing skills.  Farmers can protect themselves and their financial
condition by protecting against extreme adverse price movements.  Learning the skills
needed to make wise use of hedges, options, contracts, insurance, financial reserves, and
other risk management tools will help many farmers deal with risk in the future.16
Cutting expenses.  Most expenses are already spent or committed for 1998, but there is some
room to reduce expenditures.   Nonessential repairs can be cut.  Go easy on capital
expenditures for machinery, equipment and buildings.  If new machinery is truly needed,
consider leasing, sharing, or custom hiring versus owning; the initial expenditure may be
lower.   Prepaying less expense for the 1999 year may be a very obvious way to cut
expenditures.  However, if input suppliers offer better discounts this fall compared to
other years, the decision may be harder to evaluate.  On the personal side, family living
expenses can be curtailed to some degree.  All of these potential cuts need to be discussed
with the management team to decide whether the expenditure is indeed something that can
be cut or delayed to another year.
Increasing income.  Are there ways to increase income that have not been used before?  If you
have an empty feedlot, is it worthwhile to buy some feeders yourself or is someone else
interested in renting the facility from you.  The exposure to risk by renting to someone
else needs to be evaluated: the cost of insurance, the risk of nonpayment of rent, any
additional costs or work due having someone else’s livestock on your farm.  The potential
of increasing nonfarm income to replace declining farm income may be an alternative for
some farm families.
Government payments.  Weigh the interest savings from taking out CCC loans vs. the income
potential from the loan deficiency payment (LDP).  The LDP may be more beneficial if
you do not need the cash flow generated by the CCC loan.  Also, the recent change
allowing farmers to receive all of their 1999 government transition payments in 1998 may
help with cash flow problems.  However, marketing and tax considerations will affect
these decisions as will the concern for 1999 income.  These considerations will cause
different farmers to make different decisions based on their unique situation.
Tax management.  Consider all possible (legal) ways to minimize taxes.  Remember income
averaging is now available starting in 1998.  Also, remember that net operating losses can
now be carried back up to 5 years.  If taxable income is extremely low, be sure to obtain
the maximum earned income credits available.  Take advantage of all the state education
credits.  In some situations, a family’s taxable income may be below the minimum taxable
level, that is, no tax is due.  In these cases, the farmer may find it beneficial to sell some
products to raise income up to the point of entering the minimum taxable brackets.  For
instance, if corn can be sold in 1998 without raising taxes, a price of $1.60 may be
equivalent to receiving $2.00 and losing $.40 to the federal and state governments if the
farm was in a combined 20% tax bracket.  While the price of $1.60 is still low, this option
still needs to be considered.
Zero based budgeting.  With the prospect of low prices continuing into 1999, farmers may need to
reevaluate how they grow their crops and livestock.  Every expense should be evaluated
for its benefit compared to its cost.  Some expenses are obviously worthwhile: seed, some
fertilizer, feed, etc.  However, what is the best seeding rate when crop prices are low?  Is17
that tillage needed or is it “recreational”?  Is it worthwhile to pay technology fees when
other pest control methods are available?  What is the optimal protein percentage when
hog prices are so low?  The decision may be to continue growing as we currently are but it
may not be either.  For example, if soil tests indicate sufficient levels of P and K, this may
be the year to farm what is in the soil and not build up levels.  
Land rent negotiation.  Low prices are a very good reason to talk with landowners about
renegotiating cash rents.  Consider changing to a share rent or a flexible cash rent for the
future of increased risk.  A good starting point for rent negotiation is estimating the
revenues and costs for both the tenant and the landowner.  By splitting the total revenue
and costs, both the tenant’s maximum bid and the landowner’s minimum bid can be
estimated.  This is done as an example using information from the Southwestern Farm
Business Management Association for 1997 (Table 1).  Note that the estimates in Table 1
are different from the usual enterprise budget.  Since rent is the cost to be determined, it is
left out of the costs.  Two items used in rent negotiation but not usually in an enterprise
budget are the returns to the farmer’s labor and management for production ($25 per acre
in this example) and the landowner’s money tied up in the estimated value of the land ($88
per acre which is a 5% return on land worth $1750 per acre).  Based on these estimated
yields, prices, and costs, the tenant’s maximum cash rent is the difference between revenue
and costs or $62 per acre in this example.  In order to pay the estimated costs and receive
the desired returns to land investment, the landowner’s minimum cash rent is the total of
these costs or $121 per acre in this example. In most years, the landowner’s minimum and
the tenant’s maximum would define a negotiating range between these figures.  In this
example, there is not enough income to satisfy both parties so negotiations involve one or
both parties accepting a lower than desired return.  For example, the landowner may have
to accept less that $88 return on the money invested in land or the tenant would have to
expect less that $25 per acre for labor and management. If this is not acceptable, other
costs must be decreased or revenues increased so the two parties can reach agreement.
Liquidate unprofitable enterprises.  Now may be the time to consider liquidating that unprofitable
cow-calf enterprise or that farrowing unit that needs updated facilities to be profitable. 
Weigh the pros and cons of these decisions.  If short term debt can be substantially
reduced by selling assets being employed by these enterprises, cash flow may improve
dramatically.  On the other hand, it is not usually desirable to liquidate enterprises when
asset values are low.  But sometimes it is necessary to stop the bleeding.  Most enterprises
are probably covering their cash costs.  To make liquidation pay, you need to find a more
profitable way to employ the resources they were using.  This is often operator labor. 
You may need to consider increased off-farm employment, for example, to use the freed-
up time profitably. 
Refinance.  Take advantage of the very low interest rates now available and refinance your debt at
lower levels.  Spending money to refinance may be very wise even in a tight cash flow
situation.  Even a 1% drop in the interest rate can be worthwhile for reducing cash flow18
requirements as well as the cost of borrowing for loans to be held longer than the next 3-4
years.
Restructure.  Moving short-term debt to long-term debt by refinancing can be a very good
strategy if two conditions are present.  First, will the business be able to handle the debt
load in the future?  Second, is the management able to assure that a short-term debt
problem will not recur in another year or two?
A new mortgage.  Another option to consider (and to be wary of) is obtaining an operating loan
by putting a mortgage on currently unmortgaged land.  This may seem like the only way to
obtain an “operating” loan, but what impact does it have on future plans?  What impact on
the solvency of the business?
Rent out land.  If your personal situation for 1999 looks very bad but you have some solid
evidence that the situation may improve for future years, consider renting out all or part of
your land and subleasing your rental land for 1999.  This option may sound very drastic,
but it may make good financial sense.  If you can’t obtain sufficient operating funds from
your lender or from your own reserves, renting your own land to someone else and
continuing to farm the land you rent may help preserve your farm operation through a
tough period for better years in the future.  Talking with your lenders and landowners is
certainly necessary so they all know your plans and reasons.
Sell excess assets.  How much machinery is needed to farm?  Sell any extra tractors or equipment
that you and your team decides you do not need or can obtain the services of through
other means.  If the combine is larger than needed for your size farm, could it be sold and
harvesting done by a custom operator. (The other option of doing more custom work
yourself is an obvious alternative is mentioned below also under increasing income.)
Sell productive assets.  In extremely severe situations, selling income producing assets may be an
alternative that has to be evaluated.  Do a cash sale only; if you are in need of cash, don’t
consider a contract for deed.  Selling productive assets needs to be evaluated for its
impact on cash flow, the solvency of the business, and the impact on potential income
production.  Can the assets be sold for a reasonable value or will its forced sale drop its
price?  Will the cash received for the asset allow a sufficient amount of debt reduction?  In
some areas, selling a portion of land for nonfarm uses may be an alternative; for example,
land along a river or with a view may be sought after by people wanting either a cabin site
or a rural residence.  These alternatives may raise a good cash flow and not affect the
potential for future income potential.  One caution in all of these asset sales is the impact
on the retirement plans.  If the land for cabins or rural residences is part of a farmer’s
retirement fund but is now used to pay operating debts, what happens to the retirement
plans?
Liquidate?  If you have to get out, do so before you have lost all your equity.  We have heard19
farmers say they do not plan to repeat what some of their neighbors did in the 1980s:
struggle to survive and lose everything anyway.  Even though it is heart wrenching and
dream shattering, many farmers who have quit realize that they can live happily in town
and in other jobs.  The skills and qualities possessed by farmers (management, personnel,
leadership, initiative, work ethic, honesty, etc.) are what other employers are looking for.
Most farms will be able to survive one down year with a combination of these suggested
measures.  For those who remain in farming, better risk management skills will be needed both for
1999 and for the long run.  With the 1996 farm bill, the Federal government has been taken out of
the business of actively protecting farmers from the downside risk of the market, that is, low
prices.  So farmers need to consider many new facets of risk management that weren’t needed
before.  Hedging, forwarding contracting, and options have been available and need to be used
when appropriate.  Satisfactory, profitable prices need to be taken when available; let the
speculators speculate.  New forms of crop insurance (such as, crop revenue coverage, and
“Dollar-for-dollar”) are being offered and developed to provide protection for both price and yield
risk.  Using the futures market and buying insurance are not the only risk management tools
available.  Simple tools can be very powerful for reducing risk exposure.  Controlling debt and not
overextending the risk bearing capacity of the farm will be crucial.  Farmers may also need to
develop financial reserves or “rainy day funds” for future poor years.  
As an ending note, let us return to the first step that is necessary to deal with the financial
situation facing farmers and others involved in agriculture: fight the urge to deny this problem.20
Table 1. Comparison of tenant’s and landowner’s costs based on information from the
Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business Management Association.
Tenant’s Share: 
Long Range Plan Owner's
Corn Soybeans Share
REVENUE
Yield 120  40
Price 2.25 6.00
   Transition payment 39 1
   Other income          1          2
Total 310  243 0
DIRECT EXPENSES (except rent)
Seed  33 16
Fertilizer 48  5
Chemicals 29  30
Crop Insurance 6  10
Drying fuel 5  - 
Fuel & oil 10  8
Repairs 21  17
Misc. 7  4
Operating interest    10    8
Total  169  98 0
OVERHEAD EXPENSES
Hired labor 7 5 - 
R. E. Taxes -  -  15
Farm insurance 3 3 3
Utilities 3 2 1
Interest (opp.) 7 5 88
Depreciation 35 28 5
Miscellaneous    8    7     4
Total  overhead 63 50 116
Labor &  Management 25 25 5
Total Listed Expenses 257 173 121
Net Return (w/o rent) 53 70 -121
Average Net Return 62 -12121
Cropland Rental Market Impacts of Low Crop Prices
by
Bill Lazarus
Extension Economist, University of Minnesota
It is the time of year when tenants and landlords renegotiate rental rates for the coming year.  How will
the rental market for Minnesota cropland be affected by corn and soybean prices 25 to 30% lower than a
year ago?  Data from past years suggest that cash rents will adjust over time but adjustments will be small
compared to changes in profitability from year to year.
Tenants' expected net returns from future crops are probably the main factor determining how
much they tend to bid.  Expected net returns involve expectations about crop prices and yields, and cash
expenses.  Landlords' expenses such as property taxes may also affect their willingness to compromise on
rates in a given year, but if a widespread decline in crop prices and yields reduces the bidding willingness
of all potential tenants, then landlords may have no choice but to reduce rates.  The alternative of letting
the land lie idle will not be very attractive in most cases.
FAIRRENT Calculations for Southwestern Minnesota
FAIRRENT, a computer software package available through the Center for Farm Financial
Management at the University of Minnesota, calculates a breakeven rental rate which a tenant would be
able to pay after paying certain user-specified crop production costs, with specified crop yields and prices.
A FAIRRENT analysis is a useful starting point for rental negotiations in any year, and particularly for
1999.
Table 1 is similar to a FAIRRENT report, except that some of the detail on individual expense
items, and several yield and price sensitivity tables, are left out to save space.  FAIRRENT also includes a
share rental analysis not included here.  Table 1 illustrates how projected 1998 corn and soybean prices
and yields might affect tenants' willingness to pay rent for cropland in southwestern Minnesota in 1999.
It cost an average of $322 to grow an acre of corn on rented land in southwestern Minnesota in
1997, based on averages from the Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business Management Association
1.
Land rent amounted to $90, or 28% of this amount.  Corn averaged 125 bushels per acre in 1997.  At a
harvest-time price of $2.40, gross returns were $340 when government transition payments of $39 are
factored in.  Net returns over direct and overhead expenses were $18 per acre (line 20).  Crop enterprise
costs per acre as calculated in farm record databases include 1) direct expenses and 2) an allocated share
of cash farm overhead expenses.
The above costs do not include either cash for family living expenses, or alternatively what is
called an "opportunity cost" charge representing what the unpaid operator could have earned in other
employment.  Putting an average value of $26,283 on the operator's labor and management activities and
allocating that amount across all enterprises works out to $27 per corn acre.  Opportunity cost of operator
labor and management is separated out from the other costs in the current record summary because it is a
more subjective figure than the other costs.
Total cost with the labor and management charge included is $349 per acre, or $9 more than gross
returns.  This means that the average tenant came up short of covering the rent plus other expenses and
                                                  
1 Olson, Kent D. and others.  "1997 Annual Report of the Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business Management
Association," Staff Paper P98-3, Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul,
http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/mn/p98-03.html.22
opportunity costs.  The second column of the table shows that soybeans worked out slightly better and
made up the shortfall.  The corn-soybean rotation covered the rental expenses with a few dollars left over
(compare lines 27 and 32).    An allocated share of interest paid on debt is included, but one other cost
which is not included in these enterprise summaries is the opportunity cost of equity capital invested in
machinery, buildings and direct inputs so total costs are under-estimated to that degree.
Projections for 1998, which tenants will be looking at when negotiating rates for 1999, do not
appear as promising.  The middle two columns of Table 1 shows projected figures for the 1998 year.
Costs are not expected to change much in 1998 and 1999, so are left at 1997 levels in the analysis.  On
October 9, 1998, corn was selling for around $1.65 in southwestern Minnesota.  A loan deficiency
payment was available for $0.21 so that a producer could net an effective price of $1.81 per bushel, and
$5.21 for soybeans. Yields were forecast to run around eight percent higher than 1997 for corn and one
percent higher for soybeans, so the 1998 projection is increased to 133 for corn and 43 for soybeans.
As of October 20, 1998, an agricultural relief package with a provision for a one-time payment
equal to 52 percent of Freedom to Farm transition payments was reported to be nearing passage in
Congress.  This was factored into Table 1 as a $20 per acre increase in the transition payment for 1998
corn.
At these projected 1998 prices and yields, the amount remaining for rent for the corn-soybean
rotation drops from $95 to $53 per acre.  In a down year such as 1999 is expected to be, some tenants with
low debt may be willing to forego covering some overhead expenses in order to maintain control of their
rented acreage for the better years to come rather than losing it to other bidders.  Machinery and building
replacement is the expense most likely to be postponed
2.  The amount remaining for rent without covering
depreciation is $85, so that would just about cover last year's $89 in rent paid.  Also, some tenants may be
willing to accept less than the estimated charge for labor and management, especially if the difference can
be made up with off-farm income, other farm enterprises, or just belt-tightening.  The amount remaining
for rent if not covering either replacement (depreciation) or labor and management falls from $150 to
$109 per acre.   So, it looks as though the average tenant producer would have to forgo covering most of
machinery replacement and some of their return to labor and management (or family living expenses) if
they were to pay the same level of rent as in 1997.
The eight percent corn and one percent soybean yield increases for 1998 may be on the
conservative side, if the most recent crop reports hold true.  If yields turn out to be up 20 percent for corn
(150 bushels) and ten percent for soybeans (46 bushels), the breakeven rental rate after all costs would be
$77 rather than $53.
                                                  
2 Crop enterprise records include, in overhead expenses, a “depreciation” item which includes a portion of
replacement expenditures in the current and past years.23
Table 1. Maximum Amount Available Per Acre to Cover Cash Rent, Southwestern Minnesota Farm
Business Management Association Farms, at: 1) Long Range Planning Prices for Crops, 2)
Actual 1997 Prices, and 3) Projected 1998 Prices.
Actual 1997 Projected 1998 Long Range Plan
corn soybeans corn soybeans corn soybeans
1.  Farms that grew the crop 163 164 - -
2.  Acres, average per farm 100 108 100 108 100 108
3.  Yield per acre 125 42 133 43 120 40
4.  Price per bushel at harvest $2.40 $6.50 $1.65 $4.85 $2.25 $6.00
5.  Crop revenue per acre $300 $273 $219 $209 $270 $240
6.  Government transition payments      39 1 59 1 39 1
7.  Loan deficiency payments (projected
at $0.33/bu for corn and $0.35/bu for
soybeans)
- - 28 15 - -
8.  O t h e r  i n c o m e 121212
9.  Gross return $340 $276 $307 $227 $310 $243
10. Direct expenses per acre:
11. Rent $90 $89 $90 $89 $90 $89
12. Other direct 169 98 169 98 169 98
13. Total direct expenses $259 $187 $259 $187 $259 $187
14. Overhead expenses per acre
(allocated):
15. Machinery and building depreciation $35 $28 $35 $28 $35 $28
16. O t h e r  o v e r h e a d 2 82 22 82 22 82 2
17. Total overhead $63 $50 $63 $50 $63 $50
18. Total listed costs without depreciation $287 $209 $287 $209 $287 $209
19. Total listed costs $321 $237 $322 $237 $322 $237
20. Net return over total listed costs      $18 $39 ($15) ($10) ($12) $6
21. Opportunity cost of operator labor &
management (allocated)
$27 $21 $27 $21 $27 $21
22. Total listed costs including operator
labor & management
$349 $258 $349 $258 $349 $258
23. Total listed costs w/operator labor and
management, but not rent (line 22 +
line 11)
$259 $169 $259 $169 $259 $169
24. Amount remaining for rent after
covering depreciation and labor and
management (line 9 - line 23)
$81 $107 $48 $58 $51 $74
25. Amount remaining for rent after
covering labor and management, not
depreciation (line 24 + line 15)
116 135 83 86 86 102
26. Amount remaining for rent without
covering either depreciation or labor
and management (line 25 + line 21)
143 156 110 107 113 12324
Table 1. (continued)







27. Amount remaining for rent after covering
depreciation and labor & management $95 $53 $63
28. Machinery and building depreciation 31 31 31
29. Amount remaining for rent after covering
labor & management, not depreciation
$126 $85 $94
30. Opportunity cost of operator labor &
management
24 24 24
31. Amount remaining for rent without covering
either depreciation or labor and
management
$150 $109 $118
32. Average rent paid per acre $89 ??? ???
The long term looks a little better than the projection for next year, but it looks as though some
degree of downward adjustment in rents will be needed if tenants are to cover their costs.  Part of the
reason for this squeeze is that prices of crop inputs have risen substantially over the past several years.
Association corn yields reached 142 bushels in 1994, but the 1993 average was only 58 bushels.  Yields
averaged 115 bushels over the past ten years and 118 bushels over the past five.  Factoring in a little
upward trend, 120 bushels looks like a reasonable long range planning estimate.  Harvest-time prices have
averaged around $2.25 per bushel over the past ten years.  It is unclear how payments from commodity
programs will change in the future, so they will be kept at the 1997 level of $39 per acre.  The right two
“Long Range Plan” columns show the calculations using a “middle-of-the-road” set of yields and prices.
Under this scenario, corn gross returns are short of covering direct and overhead costs (line 20).  The
soybean net is slightly better, but over both crops the highest rent that would still cover all costs is $63
compared to 1997’s $95.
Tenants who price crops before harvest or hold them until the following year may actually
receive higher-than-harvest-time prices, or lower, so individual tenants’ breakeven rental rates will vary
from those calculated here.  Some tenants may also plan for yields different from those experienced in
recent years if they believe, for example, that El Nino will affect the weather or a solution to the wheat
scab problem will be found.  Costs can also differ considerably from farm to farm.
This analysis is based on average allocated overhead expenses reported by the 164 association
farms.  The association summaries were used because historical data was available for the historical
analysis discussed in the next section.  Another database is also available for recent years – the MnSCU
Farm Management Program summaries
3. Overhead expenses reported for the MnSCU farms are
somewhat lower than for the association.  For example, overhead expenses for corn on rented land for 334
farms in the southwestern MnSCU summary averaged $48.50 per acre, and $54.56 for 400 farms in the
south central MnSCU summary.  This is $8 to $14 less than for the association farms.  There is no easy
way to determine which database is most representative of all farms in the region.  If the MnSCU
overhead expenses were used in Table 1, the breakeven rents would be $8 to $14 per acre higher than
shown.
                                                  
3 The MnSCU Farm Management Program summaries for 1997 are available at http://www.mgt.org.25
FAIRRENT Calculations for Northwestern Minnesota
The previous analysis focused strictly on corn and soybeans.  Other crops are grown as well,
especially in central and northern Minnesota.  The largest crop by acreage in northwestern Minnesota last
yea was wheat, followed by soybeans, hay, and barley.  Financial stress was widespread in northwestern
Minnesota last year, with 30 bushel wheat yields compared to 1996's 42 bushels, along with low prices.
How does the situation look for the Red River Valley in 1998?  The Minnesota Agricultural Statistics
Service estimates 1998 average wheat yields in Minnesota at 40 bushels per acre, up 25 percent from
1997's statewide average 32 bushel yield.  Barley yields are estimated at 57 bushels,  up 12 percent from
1997.  Wheat and barley prices are down from 1997 levels, but an analysis similar to Table 1 for a Red
River Valley farm growing wheat, barley and soybeans shows a slight improvement from 1997's
situation.  Maximum rent that could have been paid in 1997 after covering all costs was negligible, at $12
per acre.  The amount rises to $19 per acre at the projected 1998 yields and prices with the reported 50
percent increase in transition payments factored in.
Historical Trends in Rental Rates Paid and Tenants’ Breakevens
How far will the cropland rental market adjust in 1999 in response to this probable change in
tenants' financial situation?  This is not the first time crop income has experienced a year-to-year decline.
One source of rental rate data is a statewide survey that has been conducted annually by the USDA since
1967
4.  Randomly selected farmers were asked what cash rents they expected to pay during the current
year.  Another source of data that goes back to 1983 is the rental expenses for corn and soybeans on cash
rented land, which has been published in the Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business Management
Association annual reports.  Figure 1 shows the USDA and association numbers.  Trends in the two sets
of rates have tracked fairly closely, with the association rates averaging 25 percent higher than the USDA
statewide averages.  Average statewide rental rates climbed sharply from 1973 to 1982, after stability in
the late 1960s.  The largest percentage rise was in 1974, with a 39 percent increase from $22 to $31.
Rates rose 13 percent in 1989 (from $53 to $60) and 13 percent in 1995 ($62 to $70).  There were
declines as well, but not as often and not by as much.  The largest decline was 14 percent in 1986 (from
$62 to $54).  Rates also declined by 4 percent in 1994 (from $64 to $62).  The reported association rates
declined by 18 percent in 1986. The biggest percentage increase was 6 percent in 1995.  Respondents in a
recent survey of six south-central Minnesota counties expected 1999 rents to decline by one to three
percent, based on a recent survey
5.
This suggests that average market rental rates are unlikely to decline by as much as this year’s
projected 44 percent decline in tenants' projected ability to pay.  How much did tenants' ability to pay
decline in these past down years?  Figures 2 and 3 compare association average gross returns and dollars
remaining for rent under different assumptions.  Figure 2 shows average gross returns per acre for an
association farm growing corn and soybeans by year from 1977 through projected 1998. Gross returns are
split out into market revenues based on harvest-time prices, government payments including deficiency
payments through 1995 and transition payments in 1996 through projected 1998, and projected loan
deficiency payments for 1998 calculated as shown in Table 1.  Crop insurance and disaster payments,
including a large payment in 1993, are included as "other income" in the crop enterprise summaries, and
so are shown separately from transition and deficiency payments in Figure 2.
                                                  
4 Rates through 1989 were published in Jones, John and Roger W. Hexem, "Cash Rents for Farms, Cropland and
Pasture, 1960-89," Statistical Bulletin B813, USDA Economic Research Service.  Rates for more recent years are
available on the USDA web site.
5 Gary Hachfeld, personal communication, Nicollet County Extension Office, September 30, 1998.  Blue Earth,
Faribault, Le Sueur, Nicollet, Sibley, and Waseca Counties were surveyed.26
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The best years in terms of gross returns were 1980 with $317 and 1996 with $318.  The high
gross in 1980 was mainly due to (harvest-time) prices of $3 per bushel for corn and $8 for soybeans.  The
next down year was 1982.  The corn price was down to $1.90, 30 cents less than a year earlier, but was
partially offset by a 15 cent deficiency payment.  The soybean price was $4.90, down 90 cents from a
year earlier.
Nineteen eighty six was also a down year in terms of markets, with $1.69 corn and $4.49
soybeans.  A $1.11 deficiency payment for corn largely made up the shortfall, however.  There was a
commodity program setaside requirement of 17.5 percent of the corn base in 1986.  The association
summaries are presented mainly in terms of harvested acres of corn rather than program acres, with
setaside acres treated separately.  Net return per acre including government payments is the only number
in the corn enterprise summary that is provided on a program acre basis, and was used in the analysis
along with USDA data on setaside requirements and deficiency payments to adjust the corn revenue and
cost data to a per program acre basis for those years when setasides were required
6.  Extraordinarily wet
weather in 1993 caused the lowest gross returns since 1979.  Yields in 1993 only averaged 58 bushels for
corn and 19 bushels for soybeans.  Much of the crop was not harvested at all, so that harvested acreage
per farm was only half that of a year earlier.  Market revenues were down 42 percent from 1992, but when
the disaster payments were added in, gross returns were only down by 14 percent.
Figure 3 shows breakeven amounts remaining to pay rent under the same assumptions as in Table
1, with costs, crop prices, yields, and acres per farm taken from the association summaries for 1977
through 1997, along with the projections for 1998.  The bottom band is the calculated amount remaining
to pay rent after paying all costs including depreciation and the opportunity cost of operator labor and
management.  The middle section shows the increase in rent that is calculated if depreciation is left out of
the cost calculation, and the top section is the rental rate when labor and management is also left out.
Labor and management charges were not allocated to enterprises until the 1996 summary.  For earlier
years, the 1997 labor and management charge was adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index.
The top line on the graph shows the rental rates reported in the summaries.  The bottom line
shows the USDA statewide survey rates.  Because of the difference in geographic coverage, the USDA
rates are not directly comparable to the costs but were included to give an indication of trends prior to
1983 when the association rent data became available.
Figure 3 shows that returns were sufficient to pay the following year’s rents actually paid in 10 of
the 15 years for which data is available (1982-96).  There were shortfalls in 1983 and 1991-3.  The
projection for 1998 looks slightly better than in 1993, when rents exceeded returns available even without
either the depreciation or labor charges included.  Perhaps rents will decline next year more than they did
in 1993, because people may realize that the 1993 economic losses were due mainly to a one-season
weather event, while the current price declines are being attributed to world economic adversity and
policy factors which might take longer to reverse.  It is interesting that statewide rental rates apparently
continued to climb through the early 1980s, and did not turn down until after the third down year out of
four.  Statewide rental rates then declined for five straight years, even as returns stabilized at a reasonably
high level.  The big 1986 decline in association rents came five years after the big 1981 decline in returns
and smaller declines in the next two years.
                                                  
6 Data on deficiency payments and setaside requirements were taken from Robert Green, "Program Provisions for
Program Crops:  A Database for 1961-90, USDA Economic Research Service, March 1990.28
Breakeven rents after all costs (bottom band) declined by 41 percent from 1980 to 1981 and 49
percent from 1992 to 1993.  So, the projected 54 percent decline for 1998 is in the same ballpark as what
happened in those two years.
Perhaps tenants base their crop price expectations on cash prices received during the year, which
probably came from selling last year's crop in the spring, rather than on the harvest-time prices shown in
Table 1 and Figure 2.  Comparing annual average cash prices received with harvest-time prices in 1985-
98, cash corn prices received over the period 1984-97 were $2.28 compared to average harvest-time
prices of $2.16.  Cash corn prices were higher than at harvest in 8 of 15 years.  Soybean annual cash
prices averaged $5.97 compared to harvest-time $5.69, with cash prices higher than at harvest in 9 of 15
years.  The difference works out to $11 more per acre available to pay rent.
What does all of this indicate about where rental rates will head for the 1999 year?  The crystal
ball is pretty cloudy, but the historical trends described in this paper would suggest that rental rates might
decline slightly this year, but it may take another year or two of financial stress before substantial declines
in rental rates are seen.
Figure 3.
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Situation and Outlook For the Livestock Sector
Brian Buhr
Dept. of Applied Economics
University of Minnesota
As with most commodity sectors livestock and meat is currently under severe price
pressure.  Following is an overview of critical fundamental factors affecting the current price
situation in livestock. Price expectations and strategies for the coming year are included.
Livestock Prices
The following two charts show the recent history of market prices for both hogs and
cattle.
While hog prices are currently low (weekly averages have been near $30/cwt. since Labor Day),
1996 and 1997 prices were high relative to average month prices.  As shown later, this was not
necessarily profitable for pork producers because feed prices were also high during those time
periods.  
In contrast to hog prices, beef prices have been low relative to averages since 1996.  This
is because cattle cycle inventories peaked in 1996 so that production has been high since mid-
decade.  In late 1997 cattle prices appeared to be recovering from their cyclical lows, however,
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dramatically higher pork production have resulted in lower beef prices in 1998.  It now appears
that any sustained higher prices will have to wait until 1999 — and until cattle feeders slaughter
off heavier weight cattle currently back-logging the beef production pipeline. 
Hog and Cattle Inventory Reports
The following two tables are the most recent USDA reports on inventories of both hogs
and cattle.  These inventory reports are the basis for forming future production expectations for
pork and beef.  Table 1 shows that there continues to be growth in all categories of hog
inventories relative to year ago levels.  September 1, breeding herd inventories are equal to a year
ago, and so we would expect the expansion in market hogs to eventually cease as well.  However,
the 3 percent increase in market hogs and the 6 percent increases in market hog inventories in the
two heavy weight categories suggest that production and slaughter will remain much higher for
the remainder of the year and into 1998.  
Table 2 shows cattle inventories.  For the first time this year, cattle on feed are lower than
the same period one year ago at 99 percent of 1997's inventory.  Given the low placements of
cattle on feed, it is likely that inventories and hence production will begin to decline relative to
year ago levels.  
Although the inventory levels provide insight into expected future production, actual meat
supplies also depend on slaughter weights, cold storage stocks and trade of both live animals and
meat. Table 3 includes production and price estimates based on current information. 31
Table 1.  September 1, 1998 Summary of Hogs and Pigs report Hog Inventories
Item September 1, 1998 % change from 1996 %change from 1997
(1,000 head) (percent) (percent)
All Hogs and Pigs 62,900 108 103
Breeding Herd 6,936 103 100
Market Hogs 55,964 109 103
Market Hogs by Weight
Under 60 lbs. 21,210 110 102
60-119 lbs. 13,743 108 102
120-179 lbs. 11,511 109 106
180 lbs. and over 9,500 109 106
Sows Farrowing
Jun-Aug 3,019 109 102
Sep-Nov* 2,922 110 102
Dec-Feb* 2,997 108 103
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service
(USDA, NASS). 
* indicates intentions to farrow in future.  
Table 2.  September 18, 1998 Summary of Cattle on Feed Report
Item Inventory from 1996 from 1997
%  change %  change 
(1,000 hd) percent percent
On Feed Aug 1 8,985 119 102
Placed on Feed During Aug 2,031 90 84
Fed Cattle Marketed During Aug 1,942 101 96
Other Disappearance During Aug 52 104 116
On Feed Sep 1 9,022 115 99
Source: USDA, NASS.  Survey of 1,000+ head capacity feedlots.32
Table 3.  Expected Production and Price Levels for Cattle and Hogs, Current - 1999
Quarter Pork Production  Hog Price Beef Production Cattle Price
Commercial 5- market Commercial Nebraska Direct
1997 (Mil. Lbs.) ($/cwt.) (Mil. Lbs.) ($/cwt.)
I 4,194 51.01 6,107 66.40
II 4,091 56.43 6,416 66.63
III 4,194 54.09 6,603 65.65
IV 4,767 43.69 6,258 66.61
1998
I 4,687 34.74 6,215 62.68
II 4,430 39.49 6,463 64.02
III 4,635 33.73 6,587 59.21
IVp 4,976 27-30 6,190 59-62
1999
Ip 4,804 30-33 5,861 62-65
IIp 4,540 32-35 6,114 64-67
IIIp 4,735 35-38 6,324 63-66
IVp 4,860 33-36 5,932 68-71
p: predicted values
Hog prices will remain under price pressure due to higher production levels through 1999. 
Expectations are currently that the first year-to-year decline in production will not occur until the
last quarter of 1999.  Producers may be slower to respond to unfavorable hog prices because of
very low priced feed. 
Beef production is entering a period of year-to-year declines in production.  This downward
production trend will likely continue through 2000 and into 2001.  Unfortunately, beef prices will
not respond quickly because of overall higher competing meat supplies.  Still, by the end of 1999,
fed cattle prices will have a chance to average in the low-70 range. 
Historical Perspective
The following two figures show the cumulative distribution of hog and cattle prices since
1980.  This could be taken back to the 1970's but we observe dramatically higher prices for both
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The cumulative density chart shows the percent of time (the y-axis) that prices have been less
than the corresponding price on the x-axis.  For example, current monthly prices averaging in the
low $30's have only occurred about 2.5% of the time since 1980.  Keep in mind that these are
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Current average monthly prices for fed cattle of $59/cwt. have only occurred about 4 percent
of the time since 1980. Hence, just as swine, it will likely take dramatic events to reduce cattle
prices much below their current levels.  
The historical context of the charts makes them useful for determining trigger strategies on
price protection plans.  For example, suppose we were fortunate enough to observe cattle futures
prices in the range of $81/cwt. From this chart it’s clear that more than 95% of the time, the
average monthly price is lower than $81/cwt.  Therefore,  forward pricing at that point would put
you in the 95  percentile of marketings.  Concerns about losing from an upward price move
th
should be limited.  Therefore, awareness of these distributionscan calm concerns about whether a
set of prices are “good” prices or not, and the probabilities of prices moving much higher or
lower.
Feed Grain Prices
For both cattle and hogs, the greatest single cost item will be feed.  While improving feed
performance is an available strategy to minimize these costs, feed grain and soymeal prices can
destroy even the best feeding program.  As shown in the crops situation, feed grain and soymeal
prices were extraordinarily high in 1996 but moderated in 1997.  To provide perspective relative
to hog and cattle prices, the following charts show hog:corn price ratios and cattle:corn price
ratios.   For hogs, the index is simply the hog price ($/cwt.) divided by the corn price ($/bushel). 
For cattle, the fed cattle price ($/cwt.) is substituted for the hog price.
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hog:corn price relationship of the decade.  One important factor to consider in this comparison is
that hog production efficiency has increased dramatically in the 1990's, hence the hog:corn
comparison can be misleading, just as comparing the consumer price index can be misleading over
time.  If efficiency has increased dramatically (i.e., it takes fewer bushels to add a 100 pound gain
to hogs), then the corn price should be given a lower weight in comparison to earlier prices. 
The steer corn price ratio does not hold quite the same direct relationship as the hog:corn
price ratio because relatively low cost forages can be substituted into cattle’s diet during times of
extraordinary feed grain prices.  Even so, this shows that cattle feeding after the mid-point of the
decade has been a low margin proposition.  In fact, returns to cattle feeding have been estimated
as negative for all but the middle-to-end of 1997.
Livestock Cycles
Within year price predictions are very difficult in livestock because of constantly changing
supply and demand conditions whereas grain prices are relatively easy to predict within the crop
year. However, cattle and hog prices exhibit predictable cycles over multiple years which make
longer term price and production predictions somewhat easier than grains where year-to-year
variation is more directly at the mercy of hard to predict weather events.   The following charts
















































The graph shows cattle inventories back to 1920.  Since the mid-1970's, cattle inventories
have been on a downward trend.  However, cycles still persist.  The peak in cattle inventories was
1996, however, prices still remain low, as it takes at least 18-24 months to move the higher calf
supplies resulting from the peak through the beef market pipeline.  It’s unfortunate, but not
surprising that beef prices are still low as of mid-1998.  However, expectations are that cattle
 inventories will again bottom out in 2000 or 2001 and one or two years later cattle and beef price
levels will peak.  This is not a new phenomenon - in fact, it’s strikingly repetitive.  
The following chart takes a slightly more detailed look at hog inventory and price cycles by
including variations of each on the same chart. Hog cycles are much shorter than cattle cycles,
lasting about four years.  The last peak in production was late 1994 so, the current peak in
production is on schedule.  It’s informative that even with the dramatic changes in the hog
industry, its cyclical nature still exists and will likely persist in the future.  Cycles are based on two
key factors: production mistakes resulting from imperfect foresight and biological lags in
production.  These conditions are not likely to change soon.  However, more capital intensive and
specialized production has likely affected the time necessary for response to changes in market

































































































































One of the great success stories of the U.S. meat industry has been its increasing exports. 
Both beef and pork have dramatically increased exports as trade liberalization has occurred.  
Beef is near becoming a net exporter on an annual basis, but the Asian economic crisis has likely
slowed its growth.  Pork so far seems to be unaffected by the Asian crisis.  However, that may be
due to reduced world supplies (particularly Taiwan and Denmark).  Asia is important because
Japan is the large export customer for both beef and pork; South Korea was also increasing in its
importance as a U.S. beef importing country; and China always remains the elusive Shangri-la of
market access.  Fortunately, Mexico has picked up much of the slack created by Japan in the pork
market. However, if the “Asian Contagion” spreads to Latin American economies as some














1965  1967  1969  1971  1973  1975  1977  1979  1981  1983  1985  1987  1989  1991  1993  1995 
Pork Production Per Sow
38
Keeping things in perspective, the U.S. only exports about 6.5 percent of its total pork production
and only about 7.5 percent of its total beef production.  In the case of pork, these hard fought
gains have been dominated by one year’s production increases.
Production Efficiency Changes
Although prices are much lower than historically and certainly are still below break-even levels
for both beef and pork, generally increasing productivity in both beef and swine likely reduces the
impacts of lower prices.
Swine productivity increases are illustrated in the above chart as “pounds of pork per sow per
year”.  This figure clearly illustrates that each sow now in the breeding herd produces more than
double the amount of pork produced by sows in the 1960's. As a result, fewer sows are required
to produce the same amount of pork as before.  
The following figure illustrates a similar productivity measure for beef. Most increases in beef
can be attributed to increasing frame sizes of cattle and greater weights at slaughter.  In hogs, the
increases are due to more intensive use of the sow (i.e., litter size has increased due to improved
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Price and Contract Issues
Open market transactions are increasingly being replaced by pre-established contracts for the
exchange of both cattle and hogs.  Contracts are offered between all possible exchanges (e.g.,
farrower to nursery, nursery to grow-finish, cow-calf to feedlot and feedlots to packers.). 
Contracts serve the important role of providing stable supplies in markets where it is sometimes
difficult to predict future supply and demand conditions which may be out of the direct control of
all participants in the contract.  They also can serve the role of reducing monitoring costs for
specific product characteristics.  An excellent example in swine is the case of high-health status
pigs.  Without “source identifying these pigs”, the buyer has a difficult time establishing the actual
status on sight.  Therefore, the buyer may contract with a farrower to deliver a pre-defined
quantity of these high-health status pigs at some negotiated price.  Similar scenarios occur
between cattle backgrounders and feedlots.  Health protocols, feeding and nutrition protocols and
implant strategies in the backgrounding phase all affect performance in the feedlot.  The feedlot
operator only has the reputation of the backgrounder to assure this quality.  Contracts offer a way
to directly communicate and facilitate the exchange of these animals with specific attributes that
are of value to the final user, but which are difficult or expensive to identify by visual inspection
or other measurement techniques.  Contracts can promote efficiency in markets and are a
necessary and useful tool, but as with most economic transactions, there are risks associated with
contracting.
The most obvious potential problem with contracts is that they may oblige one or the other of
the parties involved to unfavorable terms.  This is why it is critical to understand the terms of any
contract completely before entering into a contracting agreement.  If you are uncertain of the
terms, identify and consult with available experts such as lawyers, accountants, economists, or40
your lender.  If the other party requires you not to divulge the terms of the contract to any other
party, this should raise suspicion about the acceptability of the contract.  Remember, most people
offering contracts have an incentive to write the terms of the contract in their own favor — not
your favor.  
The second potential problem is one of pricing.  A market’s fundamental purpose is to
determine prices.  Market prices are determined by the quantities of cattle or hogs supplied and
demanded in the market.  If a contract is written as assuring or exchanging quantities between
two parties, prices of exchange must also be established.  These price mechanisms are as varied as
the number of contracts written.  If the contract is not meant to mitigate market price risk, they
may simply offer the prevailing market price as the exchange price.  The advantage of this method
is that the buyer and seller will never be at a competitive disadvantage relative to the prevailing
market price.  The disadvantage is that it offers no protection from volatile market conditions and
assumes that the market price is available.  A second method of determining price for a contract is
to use a formula technique where the contract price is determined from an existing market price of
either inputs (possibly pro-rated as costs of production) or outputs, but is not necessarily identical
to the market price.  This method may offer price risk sharing incentives, and also somewhat
follows market conditions so that the risk of either party being at a significant competitive
disadvantage relative to the market is reduced.  The final general method is a fixed price
agreement, wherein an agreed upon price will be paid for the period of time the contract is in
effect.  While this contract seems to eliminate all price risk, it is perhaps the most risky type of
contract relative to market conditions.  Setting the price too high will put the buyer at a
competitive disadvantage and setting the price too low will place the seller at a competitive
disadvantage.  It is these contracts which will likely have the greatest need for renegotiation or
simply defaulting when market conditions change dramatically as they have over the past few
months.  Both parties in all contracts must realize that neither is likely to benefit from a poorly
written contract, and that neither is likely to benefit in the long run by continuously providing
unfavorable terms of agreement. 
Finally, the least intuitive aspect of the implications of contracts are the facts that contracts can
begin to influence market conditions.  As more hogs or cattle become contracted at pre-
determined prices, the number and quality of animals available to determine the open market price
also changes and may begin to effect the behavior of market determined prices.  Unfortunately,
there is no clear threshold at which this occurs.   The other problem is that as one particular buyer
or seller contracts a greater share of the market, they may gain market power, at which point they
are more able to offer “take it-or-leave-it-unfavorable-terms” to other parties.  Again, there is no
hard and fast rule as to when this occurs.
Undoubtedly contracts are having an impact on current market prices.  Those with fixed price
agreements likely have not adjusted their output to the lower market prices which they do not
directly face.  However, over the longer run - if production stays high, those contracts will
become impossible to maintain as one party in the contract is losing and will also be eliminated or
renegotiated.  Hence, contracts may make some in the market less responsive to market prices
resulting in greater swings in the market prices observed.  This phenomenon is why market
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rubberband trying to dissipate the energy of supply and demand changes. If prices become more
fixed (less elastic) it is more likely the system will snap (just like a rubberband).
As with most aspects of economics there are both positive and negative aspects of contracts. 
Contracts can help identify and transfer products with higher or specific quality characteristics,
and they can help reduce the risk of exposure to short term market fluctuations.  However,
contracts can be poorly written and in attempting to reduce risk may actually increase risk or shift
risk from one party to the other.  Long term contracts can be particularly risky because
uncertainty naturally increases as we move out into the future.  Producers must improve their
negotiation skills if they are to protect their interests in contracts in the future.  Eliminating
contracts will further restrict an important tool for facilitating market transactions and is a rather
unimaginative solution to any problems which arise.
Price Margins - The Farmer’s Share
A final important aspect of today’s livestock market is the relationship of the farm price of
livestock to the wholesale and retail prices of meat products.  The following two charts show
these relationships for both beef and pork.
While not dramatic, wholesale price levels for both beef and pork have increased relative to
farm prices.  More dramatic has been the increase of retail prices relative to both farm and
wholesale prices.  As in most of agriculture, the farmer’s share of the consumer dollar is falling. 
Some reasons for this include (1) a greater share of further processed products at retail, (2) more
meat products being consumed away from home, where prices are generally higher (3) and
possible  unreliability of the retail price series in adequately capturing actual prices. 
The other aspect of this relationship is how quickly retail and wholesale prices respond to
changes in market price.  Data available to date show that pork retail prices have not declined
relative to farm prices.  However, retail prices can take up to six months to adjust to lower farm42
prices.  Beef retail prices have been relatively low as they are entering their second year of very
low farm prices.
Producer Strategies
Given this current situation, what are livestock producers’ strategies?  Following is an
itemized list of possibilities.
Forward Pricing Livestock
Currently, forward pricing strategies are limited.  Prices are low accross the board for futures
and options prices.  For cattle, generally upward trending prices suggest that producers are likely
best of taking holding a cash market position.  However, buying put options will be as useful way
of eliminating any remaining downside market price risk while not reducing upside potential.  Hog
producers may find it useful simply to hedge hog production.  There is not much risk of upside
price movement in the hog market, and hedging will generally be lower cost than the purchase of
put options.  Heding is a reasonable strategy mainly because of the potential for dramatically
lower hog prices in some circumstances if hog slaughter reaches levels approaching slaughter
plant capacity as some are predicting. 
Forward Pricing Feed 
Feed grain prices and soymeal prices are at their lowest levels in years.  For southwestern
Minnesota, it likely makes sense for livestock producers to forward price all their grain and
soymeal needs for the next year.  Forward booking in cash grain markets and paying the
associated carrying charges may make the most sense as reduced storage capacity and temporary
rail car shortages will likely lower cash prices in the country.  However, hedging or buying call
options will also be effective.
Production Management
Cost containment is the key factor over which producers have control.   Production
management is critical during these periods.  Minimimizing feed waste, marketing at moderate
rates to avoid over-finishing, and managing health can help assure lower costs of production. 
Avoiding overfinishing saves you feed costs as an individual, but also keeps excess weight and
hence production off the market and avoids further price discounting.
Summary
The livestock industry continues to undergo structural change.  Fewer and larger more
intensive farms, increased reliance on contracts, and dramatically improving technologies all affect
the way the livestock and meat markets behave.  As operations become more capital intensive and
cost efficient, it is likely that long run prices will be lower relative to historical levels.  It is also
highly likely that the historical price cycles will persist into the future.  However, the length and
depth of the cycles might be expected to change as producers respond differently to market43
stimulus than in the past.  
Given current high production levels across all meat sectors, it is likely that prices will
remained depressed at least through the middle of 1999.  After that point declining beef
production and moderating pork production will begin to relieve some the immediate downward
pressure on prices.  Although trade prospects seem dim given current global economic conditions,
any improvement in the global economy is likely to be reflected quickly in meat demand and hence
prices.  Favorable crop prices will also help producers limit losses.   Hog and cattle producers will
likely find it beneficial to lock in their feed grain needs at current low prices for the coming year. 
Swine producers in particular are encouraged to lock in soymeal prices which are at record low
prices for the past 20 years.44
Considerations in Developing
a Corn/Soybean Marketing Plan for 1998/99
Ward Nefstead and Stanley C. Stevens
Extension Economists
Department of Applied Economics
University of Minnesota
October 1, 1998
The rapid decline in prices of many grain and livestock products raises the interest in techniques
to do a better job of marketing--if not for good prices, at least for some basic level of profitability. 
Prices of corn for fall delivery are currently in the range of $1.38 to $1.59 for corn and $4.55 to
$5.00 for soybeans.  Forward contract bids do, however, increase to approximately $2.00 for corn
and $5.30 for soybeans in July 1999, so storage is definitely a marketing alternative.  This clearly
illustrates that just selling it may not be the optimal marketing plan.  In this paper, we briefly
touch on some general considerations for developing a comprehensive marketing plan, with our
thoughts about the current low prices and prospects of 1999 used for specific comments or as
examples.
The most important consideration is the actual decision on whether to sell or hold for sale later. 
Recent history, in the corn market for years when crops were good and fall prices low, suggests
that holding for sale later can improve the pricing opportunities (as measured by July futures) by
15 to 25 cents per bushel.  Attached is a graph (Chart 1) of July futures for the three recent years
that are somewhat comparable to 1998--1999 (July 1991 futures), 1992 (July 1993 futures), and
1994 (July 1995 futures).
Two of these years produced a spring rally (1990 and 1994) and one (1992) was mostly sideways,
but still unable to move to new lows before spring.  We believe that this phenomenon is fairly
reliable and our conviction is based mostly on the general seasonal selling patterns of farmers
versus seasonal use.  Chart 3 illustrates how new sales of corn typically exceed the use rate
through, perhaps, January.  In the February through April time frame, however, sales are slow
relative to the normal use rate.  A little more competition for new supplies tends to move price
moderately higher.  These seasonal characteristics tend to be absent in the soybean market,
probably because of the Southern Hemisphere crops, beans have more world market impact than
does corn.  This suggests that beans should be sold first to cover short-term cash flow needs.CHART 1
JULY CORN FUTURES: 





































Source: Compilation by Stanley C. Stevens,
extension economist, University of Minnesota.
Also, local prices tend to improve relative to futures every year (this is basis appreciation), but
especially in periods following low harvest prices.  Attached is Chart 2, showing the basis
appreciation for a Rice County elevator for the similar to 1998 years--1992 and 1994.  Local bids
that were as much as 60 cents under the July futures narrowed to about 25 cents under July by
late-spring.  A 35-cent basis gain will reward those who have storage and use it.  We expect it to
happen again this year.  Basis appreciation in soybeans is less assured, supporting the idea that
they should be sold ahead of corn.  Selling soybeans directly at harvest and incurring no storage
cost or tying up the potential to store corn on the farm probably makes sense.  Deferred payment
contracts should be considered if deferral of the taxability of the income is more important than





































































































Source: Compilation by Stanley C. Stevens,
extension economist, University of Minnesota.
Source: Compilation by Stanley C. Stevens,
extension economist, University of Minnesota.47
Of major importance are considerations focused on full use of government loan programs,
particularly the Loan Deficiency Payment alternative.  This payment, which is the difference
between the loan rate and the posted county price (PCP), can be collected in lieu of a commodity
loan.  An aggressive strategy that we expect to be popular this year is to collect the LDP and
store for higher prices.  The seasonal tendencies mentioned above would suggest that this
approach should have a favorable result again this year.  On the other hand, this approach does
have its downside risk as well as upside potential.  Once the LDP is collected, it no longer buffers
poor pricing opportunities that are below the loan rate.  If market prices move lower, you are no
longer able to qualify for a larger LDP.  Those who are unable or unwilling to accept this risk can
lower their risk level by selling some and holding some, or buying Put options.
One should also keep in mind, however, that foregoing the use of the loan program means
foregoing not only its price protecting aspects, but also its cash flow (cheap credit benefits) as
well.  Erlin Weness, farm management specialist at the University of Minnesota, estimates the
difference in interest rates on commodity versus bank loan places about a 5-cent penalty on corn
(and a 14-cent penalty on soybeans) on collecting LDP payments.  Also, keep in mind that these
benefits are becoming substantial and, therefore, the old CFSA compliance issues are very
important again.  Review and be sure you are in compliance with the rules of your local FSA
office regarding certification of acreage, delivery, and beneficial interest (control).
We think that the current volatility of the market is greater than ever before.  Within the last three
years, corn has ranged from historic highs (over $5) to current prices that are slightly lower than
the depressed market bottoms during the falls 1992 and 1994.  Although we think we are near the
seasonal lows for the 1998 crop, we cannot absolutely rule out lower prices ahead.
As we worry about the downside risk, we wonder mostly about how the new LDP might affect
prices under pressure.  Because the current LDP operates to protect the price the farmer receives
but does not defend any particular price--like loan programs of the past--it is possible that recent
market bottoms are no longer valid.  In 1986 when PIK certificates were an important part of the
government program to protect the farmer again sub-loan prices, Chicago futures made a low at
149-1/2 and some rural Minnesota bids were below $1.  Yet, we doubt that it will play out that
way this year.  The reason is that in 1986, because of certain nuances of the PIK program, the
certificates achieved a premium over face value in the PIK certificate market.  This created a
situation where this LDP-like buffer increased in value more than prices declined.  This created an
unstable market and a crash.  This year is a test of the middle question where the loan does not
support and the LDP is rewarding, but not subsidizing lower prices.48
It’s not too early to think about the 1999 crop.  As of October 1, 1998, the opportunity exists to
hedge new crop corn and soybeans in the futures market for $2.46 and $5.68 per bushel,
respectively, (equivalent to localized cash price of $2.11 and $5.19 using last year’s (1997) basis
levels in Mankato, a south central Minnesota elevator)--there clearly remains downside risk for
new crop regardless of good chances that 1998 prices are near support.  These better new crop
bid levels are very unlikely to hold if Corn Belt weather is normal or favorable in 1999.  On the
other hand, current stock levels are not so burdensome that a severe drought in 1999 could not
move prices substantially higher.  We think the right place to start a marketing plan is right at the
beginning when the decision is made to continue producing for another year.  Often this is in the
winter months.  No one knows how the weather will play out, but the consequences of carrying
too much risk and getting it wrong are serious in financial terms.  A risk level assessment is a
good place to start when developing the marketing plan.  Getting risk balanced with risk-bearing
ability will go a long way toward keeping the producer in business for the long-term.  There is
new software available that can help by actually measuring risk and displaying easy to understand
graphical representation of it (more details later).
The marketing plan can be fine-tuned to capture the benefits of the many marketing alternatives
that are available today.  They offer the possibilities for excellent risk control and small or
moderate price improvement.  Various marketing alternatives allow the plan to be tailored to meet
the cash flow and work scheduling preferences as well.
A market plan should review and identify the best local cash marketing bid net of transportation
costs.  For example, current local Minnesota cash prices range by 32 cents for corn and 47 cents
for soybeans as of October 1, 1998.  In some cases, the extra transportation costs can be justified,
especially if the producer has the ability and the time to transport grain (see Exhibit 1).
A number of these higher bids are from south central Minnesota elevators such as Courtland.  A
review of various marketing tools (contractual arrangements such as deferred price, basis
contracts, hedge-to-arrive (where available), minimum price and various options and futures
hedging strategies) will uncover additional opportunities to enhance the price received and
especially control the risk exposure.  As mentioned, it is wise to review the risk balance question
early in the marketing plan with long-tern survivability in mind.  This review should include
consideration of insurance guarantee programs such as revenue assurance and income protection
(where available) that can stabilize revenue per acre.  This combination of price and yield
insurance now allows the producer to protect income with greater certainty than ever before.49
As mentioned earlier, there is software that will help marketers monitor and fine-tune the
execution of their plan.  Excerpts of several programs are included.  The first is a spreadsheet
program, which compares marketing alternatives including government loans (see Exhibit 2).  The
output of this program using current price and cost data suggests that gains to storage for corn to
July 1999 would yield net prices of $1.87 for corn and $5.03 for soybeans as shown in the storage
calculating part of Exhibit 2.
The second is a program called AgRisk (an addition to MRP-Ohio State University/Baldwin)
which allows the user to view pre-harvest strategies in terms of their effect on a probability
distribution for revenue.  A comparison of four preharvest strategies--Strategy 1 involving
forward contracts, Strategy 2 involving the purchase of Put options at the money, and Strategy 3
involving the use of minimum price contracts shows a gain of over $2,000 by choosing the best
marketing alternative on a 600 are farm with 300 acres of corn and 300 acres of soybeans in Blue
Earth County.  You may obtain this software without cost by downloading it on the Internet.  The
web address is: http://www-agecon.ag.ohio-state.edu/AgRisk/download.html.
The last is a program, which works out a marketing plan from a given set of costs (see Exhibit 3). 
This program shows a basic marketing plan for corn which would yield over $90,000 of revenue
using a scale-up marketing strategy based on expected prices for 1998/99 for a south central
Minnesota farm with 300 acres of corn.  This program was introduced by AgriData and is
currently used by Ward Nefstead, one of the authors of this paper.  You may contact him directly
at (612) 625-7228 if you have questions on the use of this program.
A market information source is fundamental to the execution of the plan.  An electronic source
such as DTN or Internet sites can give you information about weather, expert opinions, and
government programs as well as the basic price data that allows users to monitor trends and
compare various market alternatives.  Local and regional market information is high quality and
easy to obtain.  Weather, as always, will be a key part of the outlook for prices in 1999.  Your
access to weather information will be an extremely important element in the execution of the
marketing strategy.
Finally, one of the most important aspects of a marketing plan is the application of the personal
discipline to execute it.  Marketing concept and tools to enhance price and control risk will not
enhance price and control risk without someone actually executing the plan.  Granting authority
to one person in a group arrangement and holding that person responsible to follow the plan is a
good idea.  Periodic group-level reviews to validate that this person is, in fact, following the plan
are good.  Where the marketer is an individual, it’s a matter of a personal commitment to give the
attention and discipline to the marketing challenge.50
Exhibit 1
Soybean Corn Spring
Price LDP Price LDP Wheat Barley Oats
Atwater AF 159
Barry 456 54 136 34 302
Beardsley 452 54 133 34 300 92
Belgrade 458 54 142 34 100
Bellingham 461 137 300 125
Beltrami 444 54 140 34 307 107
Benson UF 456 54 151 34 291
Bigelow 471 54 156 34
Bird Island 457 54 149 34 303
Blue Earth 471 54 156 34
Brandon 456 54 142 34 298 102 90
Breckenrdige 461 54 142 34 310 100
Brewster 469 54 156 34
Briclyn 471 54 156 34
Brownton 458 147
Chokio 456 54 137 34 29
Clara City 459 54 148 34 30
Clarksfield 463 54 147 34
Clarksgrove 470 54 157 34
Clear Lake 457 54 145 34
Clinton 456 54 137 34 30
Cokato 458 54 145 34
Cottonwood 464 54 147 34 30
Courtland 471 54 152 34
Crookston 445 54 141 34 30
Dawson Dg 466 54 136 34 30
Dawson A     54 34
Dawson F 466 54 140 34 30
Dennison 458 54 150 34
Delavan 473 54 156 34
 Source: Data Transmission Network, local cash prices for October 1, 1998.51
Exhibit 2
Assumptions:
      Loan rate 1,72
      Accrued interest 0.0774
      Months 9
      Rate 0.06
      Cash corn price 1.45
      Posted county price 1.45
1.  Repay CCC loan plus 2.  Loan repaid at PCP 3.  Loan forfeiture 1.72
     interest      Loan rate 1.72      Net price = loan rate
     Loan rate borrowed 1.8      PCP 1.5
     Loan rate repaid 1.8
    Accrued interest (pd) 0.0774
Cash corn price 1.45 Gain 0.22
minus accrued interest 0.0774 Plus cash corn price 1.45
Equals net corn price 1.67
1.3726
Best alternative                1.8
** An alternative for new crop is to accept a Loan Deficiency Payment, instead of a loan.
Calculation of Loan Deficiency Payment *********** 1998 crop only
    Loan rate 1.72
    Posted county price 1.45
Loan deficiency payment paid
(on bu.  not under loan) 0.27
Storage Return Calculation:
Dec Jan Feb March April May June July Aug
Sept
Corn:
Price 1.49 1.59 1.59 1.81 1.85 1.9 1.93 1.96 2
or Carry
Minus
Interest 0.0149 0.02385 0.0318 0.04525 0.0555 0.0665 0.0772 0.0882 0.1 0.015
Damage 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.05
Shrink 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Total 0.0799 0.08885 0.0968 0.11805 0.1205 0.1315 0.1422 0.1532 0.165 0.065
Net 1.4101 1.50115 1.4932 1.69975 1.7295 1.7685 1.7878 1.8088 1.835
Cost-carry 0.1777 0.18565 0.20705 0.23075 0.252 0.2737 0.2954 0.3182
Soybeans
Price 4.7 4.87 4.87 5.01 5.18 5.16 5.27 5.27 5.2
or Carry
Minus
Interest 0.047 0.07305 0.0974 0.12525 0.1548 0.1806 0.2108 0.23715 0.26 0.025
Damage 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Shrink 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.075
Fixed 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.075
Total 0.172 0.19805 0.2224 0.25025 0.2798 0.3056 0.3658 0.36215 0.385
Net 4.528 4.67195 4.6476 4.75975 4.8802 4.8544 4.9342 4.90785 4.815
(sum of 0.19805 0.42045 0.47265 0.53005 0.5854 0.6414 0.69795 0.74715
storage)
0.065




Number of acres 300 acres
Yield/acre 140 bushels
Total bushels 42,000 bushels
Projected Costs Total Cost Cost/Acre Cost/Bushel
Variable costs 43,782.00 145.94 1.04
Fixed costs 26,000.00 86.67 0.62
Total costs 69,782.00 232.61 1.66
                   Breakeven     1.66
Price Objectives
USDA Season Average Projections Expected Season Average                         1.88
1.  High 2.35/bu. Expected Range                 1.44      to        2.31
2.  Low 1.40/bu.
     Midpoint 1.88/bu. Average Sales Objective                            2.16
3.  Futures Range 0.86/bu. Selling Range                      2.02     to        2.31
Type line number if you want to change entry.
Type N to see next page.  Type M to return to MENU.
Scale Up Selling Plan
Price Target Bushels Revenue
4.  First 20% 2.02/bu 8,400 bu 16,968.00
5.  Next 20% 2.09/bu 8,400 bu 17,556.00
6.  Next 20% 2.16/bu 8,400 bu 18,144.00
7.  Next 20% 2.23/bu 8,400 bu 18,732.00
8.  Next 20% 2.31/bu 8,400 bu 19,404.00
            100%  Total 42,000 bu 90,804.00
Average Price Expected 2.16/bu
Type line number if you want to change entry.
Type B to back up.  Type M to return to MENU.
Source: Marketing plan compilation using AgriData software assumes a 300 acre farm in south central Minnesota.